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I. Developments in the European Union
A. MERGER CONTROL REGULATION- COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
During 1999, the application of the European Community (EC) Merger Control Regu-
lation' to situations of collective dominance was further confirmed and expanded. Building
on the Kali und Salz2 judgment of the EC Court of Justice in 1998, the EC Court of First
Instance (the CFI) further clarified the law on collective dominance in its judgment in
Gencor3 In its September 1999 decision in the Airtours/First Choice case, 4 the European
Commission (the Commission) for the first time prohibited a transaction where three major
competitors would remain in the market following the proposed transaction.
1. Gencor
Gencor, a South African mining group that controlled Impala Platinum (Implats), and
Lonrho, a British company with interests in two South African platinum mines held under
the Lonrho Platinum Division (LPD), notified the Commission of a proposed joint venture
between both companies whereby Implats and LPD were to be merged and would be jointly
controlled by Gencor and Lonrho.
The Commission found that the world platinum and rhodium markets are characterized
by product homogeneity, high market transparency, price-inelastic demand in the current
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1. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Under-
takings, 1989 O.J. (L395) 1; most recently amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30June 1997 Amending
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1997 OJ. (L180) 1.
2. French Republic v. Commission (Kali und Salz), 4 C.M.L.R. 829 (1998).
3. Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 971 (1999).
4. Airtours/First Choice, Commission Decision (Sept. 22, 1999).
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price range, moderate growth in demand, mature production technology, high entry bar-
riers, a high level of concentration, financial links and contacts between suppliers in a
number of markets, a lack of negotiating power for purchasers, and a generally low level
of competition historically. The Commission also found that following the proposed trans-
action, Implats/LPD and the Anglo American Platinum Corporation, its main competitor,
would each hold approximately a thirty-five percent share of the world platinum market (a
combined market share of approximately seventy percent). It also found that, following the
anticipated exhaustion of Russian stocks in two years, the two competitors' shares would
rise to forty percent each (a combined market share of approximately eighty percent).
The Commission concluded that the effect of the proposed joint venture would be to
create duopolistic dominance in the platinum and rhodium markets. On this basis, it pro-
hibited the proposed transaction. Gencor appealed against the Commission's decision to
the CFI.
In its judgment, the CFI accepted the Commission's position that the market character-
istics that it had found could be used to identify markets prone to oligopolistic dominance.
The CFI also concluded that structural links are not necessary for a finding of collective
dominance. The likelihood of tacit coordination may be sufficient. The Court upheld the
Commission in concluding that anti-competitive market structures could result not only
from economic links between market participants but also as a result of oligopolistic market
structures where each market participant may become aware of common interests and, in
particular, cause prices to rise without having to enter into a cartel arrangement.
2. Airtours/First Choice
The Airtours/First Choice case involved a proposal by one U.K. tour operator, Airtours,
to acquire a competing tour operator, First Choice. Both companies were fully vertically
integrated with substantial investments in charter airlines operations and travel agencies.
The Commission found that the proposed transaction would affect the supply of foreign
package tour holidays to U.K. residents and, in particular, package holidays made to popular
destinations in Southern Europe and North Africa. The market structure was already highly
concentrated with four vertically integrated companies accounting for eighty percent of the
market. The rest of the market was fragmented amongst a large number of much smaller
players, none of them fully integrated and most with shares of one percent or less.
Package tours were found to be a high volume, low margin product. The Commission
found that a particular characteristic of the market was that capacity (the number of holi-
days) was basically fixed before the sales season began; only relatively minor adaptations
were possible afterwards. As a result, the overall supply/demand balance had a strong effect
on profitability. In particular, competition for market share risked leading to oversupply
with serious negative financial consequences for market operators, whereas constraining
capacity would result in markedly improved profitability for all operators. Therefore, tour
operators had an incentive to keep capacity in the market tight.
The Commission also found that the major operators were linked insofar as they supplied
one another with airline seats and distributed one another's products, that they had similar
cost structures, and that there were high barriers to entry and growth and no countervailing
buyer power.
The Commission found that, since First Choice would disappear both as a competitor
in its own right and as a supplier of charter airline seats and travel agency distribution to
the nonintegrated operators, the proposed takeover would create a market structure in
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which the remaining three vertically integrated companies would collectively have a dom-
inant position. Accordingly, the Commission prohibited the proposed transaction.
B. EUROPEAN COMMISSION BLOCK EXEMPTION - REGULATION FOR VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
1. Introduction
As the final stage in a process that began early in 1997 with the publication of a Green
Paper,' the Commission, in December 1999, adopted a regulation providing for a block
exemption of vertical agreements. 6 Following a transition period, the new Vertical Agree-
ments Block Exemption will replace the three block exemptions that have been the bedrock
of the Commission's vertical restraints policy: the Exclusive Distribution Block Exemption, 7
the Exclusive Purchasing Block Exemption,' and the Franchising Block ExemptionY
With the new Block Exemption, the Commission has indicated that it seeks to create a
"safe harbour" for vertical agreements under the EU competition rules. Where the regula-
tion's market share thresholds are not exceeded and where the parties to a vertical agree-
ment avoid the inclusion of hard-core restrictions, they can be assured that article 81(1)1°
of the EC Treaty will not apply. Their arrangements will benefit automatically and without
prior notification from an exemption under article 81(3)" of the EC Treaty.
2. Agreements Covered by the New Block Exemption
The Vertical Agreements Block Exemption applies to all agreements that:
" involve two or more parties (the three existing vertical block exemptions are limited to
agreements to which only two undertakings are party);
" involve each of the parties operating at a different level of the production or distribution
chain; and relate to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell, or resell
goods or services.
3. Agreements Not Covered by the New Block Exemption
The new Block Exemption will not apply to agreements relating primarily to the assign-
ment or use of intellectual property rights. However, the Vertical Agreements Block Ex-
emption will apply to vertical agreements that include provisions relating to the assignment
to or the use by the buyer of intellectual property, provided that those provisions do not
constitute the primary object of the agreement and are directly related to the use, sale, or
resale of goods or services by the buyer or its customers. Also, the new Block Exemption
will not apply to vertical agreements that fall within the scope of another block exemption
(for example, motor vehicle distribution and servicing arrangements). Furthermore, the
Vertical Agreement Block Exemption will not apply to vertical agreements entered into
5. Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU Competition Policy, COM(96) 721.
6. Commission Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 OJ. (L336) 1.
7. Commission Regulation 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3) to Categories of
Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983 OJ. (L173) 1.
8. Commission Regulation 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 OJ. (L173) 5.
9. Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 3 0 November 1988 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty
to Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L3 59) 46.
10. Formerly art. 85(1).
11. Formerly art. 85(3).
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between competitors. It may, however, apply to certain nonreciprocal vertical agreements
between competitors.
4. The Market Share Thresholds
In a major innovation, the Commission has accepted in the Vertical Agreements Block
Exemption that the likelihood of the efficiency-enhancing effects of vertical agreements
outweighing any anti-competitive effects depends on the degree of market power of the
undertakings concerned. The Block Exemption, therefore, includes a market share thresh-
old. The new Block Exemption will apply on the condition that the supplier's market share
does not exceed thirty percent. In addition, in the case of exclusive supply agreements, the
new Block Exemption will apply only where the buyer's market share also does not exceed
thirty percent. Even where parties cannot benefit from the new Block Exemption due to
their market share, however, the Commission has made it clear that there will be no pre-
sumption of illegality with respect to the agreements.
5. "Hard-Core" Restrictions
The Commission has set out a list of "hard-core" restrictions, the inclusion of which will
deprive an agreement of the protection offered by the new Block Exemption. Parties to
vertical agreements may not:
" restrict the buyer's ability to determine its sale price (although, subject to some con-
ditions, the supplier may impose a maximum sale price or recommend a resale price);
" restrict the territory into which, or the customers to whom, a buyer may sell (although
there are exceptions that permit the restriction of active sales in exclusive relationships,
sales to end-users by wholesalers, and sales to unauthorized distributors by members
of a selective distribution system);
" in the context of selective distribution systems, restrict active or passive sales to end-
users by members of a system or restrict cross-supplies between distributors within a
system; or
" restrict, in certain circumstances, the supply of spare parts to independent repairers.
6. Other Restrictions
The new Block Exemption also includes a list of restrictive obligations that the Com-
mission regards as unacceptable:
" any direct or indirect non-compete obligation, the duration of which is indefinite or
exceeds five years. Where goods or services are sold by the buyer from the supplier's
premises, however, the non-compete restriction may be coterminous with the period
of occupancy by the buyer;
" any post-term non-compete obligation (although a one year post-termination non-
compete obligation may be acceptable in some cases where it is justified by reference
to the protection of know-how and where it is limited to the premises from which the
buyer operated during the contract period);
" any obligation on dealers in a selective distribution system not to sell the brands of
particular competing suppliers.
These obligations can be distinguished from the "hard-core" restrictions in that their
inclusion will not deprive the whole of a vertical agreement of the benefit of the Block
Exemption. The exemption is only lost in relation to the individual restrictive obligation.
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7. Transitional Arrangements
The new Block Exemption will apply to vertical agreements concluded from June 1, 2000
onwards. In the interim, the regulation extends the validity of the current Block Exemptions
(which were to expire on December 31, 1999) until May 31, 2000. Agreements already in
force on June 1, 2000, which satisfy the current Block Exemptions but which would not
qualify under the new regime, will be valid until December 31, 2001.
C. EUROPEAN COMMISSION MODERNIZATION WHITE PAPER
In April 1999, the Commission issued a White Paper on the modernization of EC com-
petition law.2 The purpose of the White Paper was to consider options for bringing the
procedural rules of EC competition law (which have remained substantially untouched since
the adoption of Regulation 17 in 1962) up to date to reflect the changed realities of the
Community and of the enforcement priorities of the Commission. Regulation 17 estab-
lished a centralized authorization system for all restrictive practices requiring exemption.
While discussing several options in the White Paper, the Commission ultimately pro-
poses a reform that would involve the abolition of the existing notification and exemption
system, and its replacement by a Council regulation that would render the article 81(3)
exemption directly applicable where its conditions were satisfied without prior decision by
the Commission. In the new system, the Commission would seek to keep a leading role in
determining EC competition policy through the adoption of regulations and of notices
setting out the principal rules of interpretation of articles 81 and 82. The Commission
would also continue to adopt prohibition decisions and positive decisions to provide guid-
ance on its interpretation of articles 81(1) and 81(3).
Most commentators have welcomed the proposed abolition of the prior notification sys-
tem and the reallocation of resources within the Commission away from the processing of
exemption requests. They have expressed some concern, however, over the consistency of
interpretation of the article 81(3) exemption criteria if it becomes directly applicable before
the national courts and competition authorities. It has been suggested that the Commis-
sion's proposal could result in inconsistencies in the findings made under article 81(3) by
the various national courts and authorities empowered under the proposed reform to grant
exemptions.
The Commission's consultation on the White Paper closed at the end of 1999 and de-
cisions on how to proceed with reform are expected during 2000.
D. STATE AID
1. Procedural Rules
The Council of the European Communities has adopted a regulation 3 laying down de-
tailed procedural rules in relation to state aid. The regulation codifies procedures that were
previously laid down in a number of Commission Communications and EC Court judg-
ments.
12. White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, Com-
mission Programme 99/027, COM (99) 101.
13. Council Regulation 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Application of
Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 1999 O.J. (L083) 1.
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2. Notification of Aid
The regulation provides that the member state concerned must notify the Commission
of any plans to grant new aid. Until a decision is taken or deemed to have been taken by
the Commission, the aid must not be put into effect. Aid that has not been notified or that
is put into effect before the Commission's decision is regarded as unlawful aid.
The Commission is given a two-month period from the date of notification within which
it is expected to make a decision. The initial period may be extended if further information
is requested. If the Commission does not reach a decision within two months, aid will be
deemed to have been authorized and the member state may proceed to grant the aid. If the
Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the notified aid, it may decide to initiate
a formal investigation procedure. Once the Commission opens an investigation procedure,
it is required to make a decision within eighteen months. If there has been no decision
within that time, the member state involved may call on the Commission to make a decision
within two months.
3. Submission of Comments by Interested Parties
Any interested party may submit comments where the Commission initiates an investi-
gation procedure. Interested parties may also inform the Commission of alleged unlawful
aid or alleged misuse of aid.
4. Procedure Regarding Unlawful Aid
The new regulation gives the Commission powers to require a member state to suspend
any aid that has not been notified until it has made a decision on the compatibility of the
aid. Furthermore, the Commission may adopt a decision requiring the member state to
provisionally recover such aid pending a final decision. This provisional recovery of aid will
only occur in the extreme cases provided for in the regulation where there is no doubt
about the aid character of the measure concerned, or where there is a serious risk of sub-
stantial and irreparable damage to a competitor.
Recovery of aid is now subject to a limitation period. If ten years elapse from the grant
of the unlawful aid, the Commission may no longer recover the aid. However, any action
taken by the Commission with regard to unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period
and start time running afresh.
5. Existing Aid Schemes
In relation to an existing aid scheme, the regulation provides that the Commission may
conclude that such a scheme is no longer compatible and may issue a recommendation
proposing substantial amendment of the aid scheme, the introduction of procedural re-
quirements, or the abolition of the aid scheme.
6. Monitoring of State Aid Schemes
If advance warning is given to the member state concerned, the Commission may make
inspections at company premises when it has serious doubts about compliance with its
decisions on state aid. The inspectors' powers are roughly equivalent to those provided for
in cases of investigations of breaches of the competition rules.
E. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION- EU-CANADA COMPETITION COOPERATION AGREEMENT
The EU-Canada summit, held in Cologne in June 1999, was marked by the signing of
a competition cooperation agreement. This agreement supplements three earlier cooper-
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ation agreements made between the European Union and Canada 4 and is similar in sub-
stance to the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement already in place between the European
Union and the United States.
The agreement provides a framework for cooperation between the Canadian and the EU
competition authorities. In particular, it seeks to increase the effectiveness of coordinated
enforcement activities and to prevent conflicting decisions between those authorities. The
agreement provides for:
" notification of cases under investigation by one party to the other, where the important
interests of the latter are affected;
" "positive comity" whereby one party may request the other party to act where important
interests of the former are affected by anti-competitive behavior on the latter's territory;
" "negative comity" whereby a party to the agreement will consider all relevant factors
where its enforcement activities affect the important interests of the other party;
" exchange of nonconfidential information that will facilitate the effective application of
EU and Canadian competition law;
" coordination of enforcement activities where significant issues for both sides are in-
volved; and
" semi-annual meetings.
II. Developments in the United States
In 1999, antitrust enforcement in the United States focused on several areas having sig-
nificant international components, including: (i) judicial decisions affecting the scope and
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws; (ii) prosecution and punishment of alleged international
cartels; (iii) global cooperation in merger review/enforcement; and (iv) continued (and in-
creased) international cooperation efforts among competition agencies.
A. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In In re itamins Antitrust Litigation," the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia addressed the issue of "whether, pursuant to section 12 of the Clayton Act, the relevant
forum in which to analyze Defendant's contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction is [the
forum in which the action was filed] or the United States as a whole.16 Relying on Chysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp.," which had held that "[s]ection 12 essentially is a long-arm
statute which permits service of process in a nonforum district, so long as the venue provision
is met,""s the foreign defendants in this action contended that the court lacked jurisdiction
over them unless they had sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia. 9 The defen-
dants did not contest the general rule, which is that "when a federal court is attempting to
14. Agreement for Economic and Commercial Cooperation, July 6, 1976; Declaration on European
Community-Canada Relations, Nov. 20, 1990; Joint Political Declaration on Canada-EU Relations, Dec. 17,
1996.
15. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 72,627 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999).
16. Id. at 85,637.
17. Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
18. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
19. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 85,638.
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exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit based on a federal statute providing
for nationwide service of process, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has had
minimum contacts with the United States."20 Nonetheless, they argued that the "first pro-
vision of section 12 governing venue has limited the application of the general rule."2'
The court found that the venue provision, if anything, was intended "to expand the reach
of [the] antitrust laws."2 Therefore, it concluded, the relevant forum for purposes of min-
imum contacts analysis is the United States as a whole .2 However, in light of the D.C.
Circuit's later ruling in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,24 the court in In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation subsequently ruled that the local contacts test will apply."
2. The Substantive Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
In Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.2 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reviewed a grant of summary judgment that had been awarded in favor of
U.S. corporate defendants accused of conspiring to eliminate the U.S. market for the export
of certain telecommunications services to Mexico.2" Because the relevant market was limited
to exports, the court reasoned there can be no antitrust injury unless Mexican law permits
the U.S. exporters to compete with the state-created telecommunications monopoly in
Mexico. 20 As the court emphasized, "[elven in the U.S., the existence of a legitimate gov-
ernment granted monopoly precludes claims of antitrust violation when a plaintiff wants
to compete in the regulated market." 9 Ultimately, however, the court found that Mexico
did not, at the time in question, prohibit importation of the telecommunications services
at issue and reversed the grant of summary judgment on that basis.
B. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL CARTEL BEHAVIOR
Enforcement efforts in the United States, particularly against international cartel behav-
ior, reached "precedent-setting and record-shattering" levels in fiscal year 1999, according
to the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (Antitrust Division).30
As of December 1999, there were "over thirty-five sitting grand juries looking into sus-
pected international cartel activity. The subjects and targets of these investigations are lo-
cated on five continents and in over twenty different countries.""
A large bulk of the criminal fines secured in 1999 were related to the Antitrust Division's
investigation into an alleged worldwide conspiracy to fix prices and allocate market shares
20. Id. (quoting Busch v. Buchman, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1996)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 85,639.
23. Id.
24. GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
25. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 94 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2000).
26. Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,735 (5th Cir. 1999).
27. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 86,413.
28. Id
29. Id.
30. Joel I. Klein, The War Against International Cartels: Lessons from the Battlefront (Oct. 14, 1999), in U.S.
Dep't ofJustice (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3747.htm> [hereinafterLes-
sons].
3 1. Gary R. Spratling, International Cartels: The Intersection Between FCPA Violations and Antitrust Violations
(Dec. 9, 1999), in U.S. Dep't of Justice (visited July 12, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
398 l.hun>.
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for certain vitamins sold in the United States and elsewhere.32 In that investigation, U.S.
antitrust authorities collected a record $875 million in criminal fines in 1999.11 Additionally,
as "an important part of the deterrent value of [its] criminal enforcement program, 3 4 the
Antitrust Division obtained jail sentences and individual fines for those corporate officials
who were at the center of illegal cartel activities." For example, in connection with the
department's investigation of an international cartel in the graphite electrodes industry, a
former executive of UCAR International agreed to pay a $1.75 million fine and serve sev-
enteen months in jail.'6Joel Klein, the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division,
stated that "[t]his case should send a strong message to other executives that participation
in cartels that victimize U.S. businesses and consumers will result in severe penalties.""
In contrast, in United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd.," the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts granted a directed verdict of acquittal in favor of the defen-
dant.3 9 At an earlier stage in the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
reversed a dismissal of the case, holding that the U.S. antitrust laws have extraterritorial
application in both civil and criminal cases.- The government's case centered around a
meeting between the defendant and several of its competitors that was called to address a
common legal threat of "dumping" charges against Japanese firms in the industry.4' After
a trial that "proved complex and troubling, '42 the jury was unable to reach a verdict.4 3
Subsequently, the trial court granted a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29. 4 Reasoning that competitors can "lawfully meet to discuss com-
mon concerns[,] ... market conditions, and even prices[,]"14 the court concluded that the
government had introduced no other evidence from which a rational fact-finder could
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a conspiracy to fix prices had been formed.-
Even if such evidence had been introduced, the court continued, there was no evidence at
all that either the "conspiracy" or its alleged effects on U.S. commerce continued beyond
the date that would have saved the prosecution from a statute of limitations defense .
7
C. INTERNATIONAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT
In fiscal year 1999, pursuant to the pre-merger notification requirements of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 41 the federal agencies charged with
32. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, F. Hoffman-La Roche and BASF Agree to Pay Record Criminal
Fines for Participating in International Vitamin Cartel, Press Release (May 20, 1999).





38. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999).
39. Id. at 177.
40. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1044(1998).
41. See Nippon Paper Indus., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
42. Id. at 177.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 180.
46. See id. at 196.
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
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merger enforcement-the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission-re-
viewed approximately 4,600 transactions, many of which involved significant international
components.49 As a result, U.S. antitrust authorities report that they have engaged in regular
contacts with their foreign counterparts on individual mergers, which proved especially
important in several cases.5s Indeed, as of July 1999, twenty-one of the thirty-eight second
requests issued by the Federal Trade Commission involved transactions also subject to
notifications to foreign competition agencies; of these, twelve involved "substantial discus-
sions" with those agencies."'
A good example of inter-jurisdictional cooperation is the merger of the U.K.-based phar-
maceutical company Zeneca with the Swedish pharmaceutical firm Astra. Regulatory au-
thorities in the United States and the European Union were concerned that this merger
could cause anti-competitive effects in the market for long-acting local anesthetics. 2 Astra
was a supplier in this market. Although not a supplier itself, Zeneca's license arrangement
with a third party to develop a new and potentially better anesthetic represented, in the
eyes of the authorities, "the only potential new competition in the ... market for the fore-
seeable future."" Through cooperation, the agencies and the parties in both jurisdictions
were able to agree quickly on a potential remedy-severance of Zeneca's relationship with
the third party supplier in a way that did not adversely affect that third party's ability to
market its new product.5 s
D. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Antitrust officials in the United States report that international enforcement cooperation
is both "broadening and deepening."" The broadening of cooperation can be seen in the
increasing number of bilateral cooperation agreements entered into between the United
States and other nations.56 It is deepening "through the almost-daily contacts the U.S.
antitrust agencies ... have with their [foreign] counterparts."5 1
Of particular interest, on April 26, 1999, the United States and Australia" signed the
first agreement entered into under the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
of 1994.s9 The 1994 legislation was enacted so that both the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission would have the authority to enter into agreements with other
countries, allowing for (i) the sharing of otherwise confidential antitrust evidence,6 ° (ii) the
49. See Richard G. Parker, Global Merger Enforcement (Sept. 28, 1999), in U.S. Dep't ofJustice (visited July
15, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/barcelona.htm>.
50. See id. (discussing four specific cases wherein the remedying of potential anticompetitive harms was




54. See In re Zeneca Group PLC, FTC Dkt. No. C-3880 (une 7, 1999), available at <http://www.ftc.
gov/os/1999/9906/zenecad&o.htm>.
55. SeeJohnJ. Parisi, Enforcement Cooperation AmongAntitrust Autorities (May 19, 1999), in U.S. Dep't of
Justice (last modified Nov. 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ibc9905991 lupdate.htm>.
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. See Federal Trade Commission, First International Antitruct Assistance Agreement Under New Law An-
nounced by FTC and DOJ, Press Release (last modified Apr. 27, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov>.
59. See International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (IAEAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12 (1998).
60. See id. § 6202.
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use of their investigative powers to gather antitrust evidence for use by foreign govern-
ments,61 and (iii) the withholding from public disclosure of any antitrust evidence obtained
from foreign governments.62
Also in 1999, the United States entered into bilateral cooperation agreements with Is-
rael,61 Japan,64 and Brazil. 6s While these agreements differ in their details, all provide for
both notification about anticipated enforcement activities that may affect the other's im-
portant interests, and a general statement of intent to cooperate in matters of antitrust
enforcement.66 All three agreements expressly allow each party to consider its own national
interests when deciding the scope of cooperation it shall provide, if any.6 Unlike the agree-
ment with Australia, none of these agreements allows for the sharing of confidential infor-
mation.
Less formal cooperation is also taking place in the area of prosecuting international
cartels. Assistant Attorney General Klein has stated that the U.S. prosecution of interna-
tional cartel cases "would have been much less successful ... [without] ... the assistance of
foreign law enforcement agencies .... With rare exceptions, foreign governments no longer
even try to defend the indefensible, so long as antitrust enforcers treat the foreign subjects
of an investigation fairly. That means that [the] focus in criminal cartel cases can be on the
evidence and the harm to consumers, and not on politics.""s
Finally, the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) continued
its work on international antitrust issues during 1999. ICPAC was formed in November
1997 to provide advice and information to the U.S. Attorney General and Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division on international antitrust issues, such as trans-
national cartels, multi-jurisdictional merger reviews, international anticompetitive business
practices, and cooperation with foreign nations and regional economic integration orga-
nizations on competition law issues.69 In 1999, ICPAC met on four occasions for panel
discussions on several topics including multi-jurisdictional merger review, confidential in-
formation sharing, the interface of international trade and competition policy, and the role
of international institutions in competition policy. It issued its final report in February 2000.
I. Developments in Canada
A. AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPETITION ACT
In March 1999, various amendments to the Competition Act (the Act) were proclaimed
into force. In part, those amendments amended the Criminal Code to allow wiretapping
61. See id. § 6203.
62. See id. § 6208.
63. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
State of Israel regarding the application of their competition laws, March 15, 1999, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Ret. (CCH) 113,506 (Trade Mar. 15, 1999).
64. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government ofJapan
concerning cooperation on anticompetitive activities, Oct. 7, 1999, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Ret. (CCH)
1 13,507 (Trade Oct. 7, 1999); see also section V(C) infra.
65. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil regarding cooperation between their authorities in the enforcement of their
competition laws, October 26, 1999, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Ret. (CCH) 13,508 (Trade Oct. 26, 1999).
66. See Enforcement Act.
67. See id.
68. See Lessons, supra note 30.
69. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Charter of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, para. B., (last
modified Oct. 12, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/charter.pdf>.
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with respect to the basic conspiracy offense, bid rigging, and telemarketing; created statu-
tory protections for whistleblowers; changed the name of the Director of Investigation and
Research to the Commissioner of Competition; and amended the provisions in the Act
dealing with prohibition orders. Perhaps most significantly for international merger trans-
actions, those amendments also changed the provisions in the Act dealing with interim
injunctions, to give the commissioner the ability to delay a merger for up to thirty days
(with the possibility of a further thirty-day extension) upon certification that a formal in-
quiry has been commenced and more time is required to complete the inquiry.
In December 1999, various related amendments to the pre-merger notification provisions
in the Act were proclaimed into force. The principal changes to the pre-merger notification
regime involve: (i) doubling the existing seven and twenty-one day waiting periods appli-
cable to short-form and long-form filings, respectively, and (ii) substantially increasing the
amount of information required to be provided as part of a long-form filing. (The changes
to the list of information required for short-form filings were relatively minor.) It may also
be noted that the target of a share acquisition will now be required to provide the applicable
information, even if it is not one of the parties "proposing" the transaction, i.e., even if it
is a hostile transaction.
The substantial expansion of the list of information required for long-form filings likely
will result in significantly greater costs being incurred by merging parties where a long-
form filing is required. The following passages are perhaps the most controversial proposed
additions to the list of information required for a long-form filing:
" all reports, studies, surveys and analyses that were prepared or received by a senior
officer, together with an indication of the date of preparation, and the name and tide
of the author of each document, that were prepared for the purpose of evaluating or
analyzing the proposed transaction with respect to [the principal categories of products
produced by the notifying party that, to the extent known by the notifying party, are
produced, supplied or distributed both by that party or its affiliates and the other party
to the proposed transaction or its affiliates (Overlapping Products)], and the potential
impact of the merger on prices for the Overlapping Products, market shares for the
Overlapping Products, competition or competitors for the Overlapping Products, in-
novation and the potential for sales growth or expansion into new products or geo-
graphic regions;
" all marketing, business and strategic plans, and similar documents that were prepared
or received by a senior officer, and that have been implemented in Canada over the last
three years or are to be implemented in Canada, for each of the Overlapping Products.
These changes to the pre-merger notification regime, taken together with the softening
of the test required for the commissioner to obtain a pre-closing injunction, are unlikely
to have a significant effect on straightforward transactions. In transactions raising poten-
tially significant prima facie issues, however, these changes may increase the likelihood of
the commissioner requiring a long-form filing (which historically has seldom been required)
and may make it more difficult for merging parties to close such transactions prior to the
completion of the Competition Bureau's (the Bureau) review. Representatives of the Bureau
have stated that a long-form filing will likely be required with respect to all transactions
designated as "very complex," as well as transactions towards the more difficult end of the
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"complex" category. Long-form filings will not be required for transactions falling within
the "noncomplex" category. 0
B. CRIMINAL FINES CONTINUE TO INCREASE
In the fall of 1999, the Bureau announced that fines totaling $88.4 million had been
imposed in relation to multiple conspiracies to fix prices and allocate market shares for ten
vitamin and food additive products sold in Canada. These are the largest fines ever imposed
under the Act and the largest criminal fines in Canadian legal history. They all followed
guilty pleas by the relevant participants.
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. was sentenced to pay a total fine of $50.9 million, of which
$48 million was for offenses relating to bulk vitamins and $2.9 million for its role in an
unrelated conspiracy involving citric acid. The latter conviction follows that of ADM, Haar-
man & Reimer and Jungbunzlauer, who were fined a total of $8.6 million in 1998 for their
participation in the citric acid conspiracy.
Subsequently, Mr. Andreas Hauri, a Swiss national and former Head of Global Marketing
for the Vitamins and Fine Chemicals Division ofE Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., was convicted
and fined a total of $250,000 for his part in the vitamin and citric acid conspiracies. Mr.
Hauri's former supervisor, Dr. Roland Bronnimann, was also fined $250,000 for his role in
the bulk vitamins matter. BASF AG was fined $18 million in connection with the vitamin
conspiracies.
In addition, the court imposed a $1 million fine for its participation in another conspiracy
relating to choline chloride. Also, Rh6ne Poulenc S.A. was fined $14 million with respect
to conspiracies relating to vitamins A and E; Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. was sen-
tenced to a fine of $2.5 million for its participation in vitamin conspiracies involving B5
and B6; and Eisai Co. Ltd. was required to pay a fine of $2 million for having participated
in a conspiracy relating to vitamin E. Chinook Group Limited was fined $2.5 million for
its participation in the choline chloride matter. This followed the conviction of Mr. Russell
Cossburn, former Vice President-Sales, for his part in the matter while employed by
Chinook. He was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, to be served in the community,
because of his age and on the finding that he posed no risk of re-offending and no danger
to the community.
Moreover, Roussel Canada Inc., a subsidiary of Hoescht Marion Roussel S.A., pleaded
guilty and was convicted under a seldom used provision of the Act (s.46) for implementing
a foreign directed conspiracy in regard to pharma-grade vitamin B12. It was fined a total
of $370,000. This followed a fine of $11 million imposed against UCAR Inc. earlier in the
year under the same provision of the Act, for implementing pricing directives from its U.S.-
based parent company, UCAR International Inc., as part of a scheme designed to coordinate
worldwide prices of graphite electrodes used primarily in the steel industry.
C. EU-CANADA COOPERATION AGREEMENT
In June 1999, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced the signing of an Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the European Communities Regarding the Ap-
70. Pursuant to the Bureau's User Fee Policy, the maximum review periods required by the Bureau to
complete its review of noncomplex, complex, and very complex transactions are fourteen days, ten weeks and
twenty-one weeks, respectively. These time periods are separate from the statutory waiting periods described
above.
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plication of Their Antitrust Laws (the Agreement). The Agreement, very similar in format,
style, and content to the 1995 Canada/U.S. Cooperation Agreement and the 1991 U.S./EU
Cooperation Agreement, does, however, have some noteworthy differences, including
stronger provisions relating to confidentiality, positive comity, and negative comity than
those contained in the U.S./EU Cooperation Agreement.
D. COMMISSIONER CONTINUES TO ACCEPT MERGER UNDERTAKINGS
Notwithstanding various suggestions by senior representatives of the Competition Bu-
reau over the last few years, the Commissioner continued to accept undertakings to the
effect that greater use would be made of the consent order process when remedies are
offered to resolve concerns in merger cases. For example, in December 1999, the Bureau
announced that the Commissioner would not challenge the acquisition by Sobeys Inc. of
The Oshawa Group Limited, after Sobeys offered a package of divestiture undertakings.
That acquisition had been permitted to proceed in December 1998, after Sobeys provided
other undertakings to hold separate and apart from its own business certain parts of Osh-
awa's business, pending the completion of the Bureau's review. The resolution of the So-
beys/Oshawa matter followed another settlement reached earlier in the year, again without
the need for consent order proceedings, with respect to Loblaw Companies Limited's ac-
quisition of Provigo Inc., and the Atlantic Canada wholesale and retail assets of Oshawa.
Similarly, in December 1999, after determining that Canadian Airlines Corporation (Ca-
nadian) "is facing imminent insolvency," the Competition Bureau announced that the Com-
missioner would not oppose the acquisition of Canadian by Air Canada and its partner,
853350 Alberta Ltd. Canadian and Air Canada are the only two national carriers operating
in Canada. Apparently, unlike any other previous failing firm merger, however, the Bureau
required Air Canada to provide various undertakings "designed to enhance the competitive
climate in the airline industry in Canada." According to the Bureau's Press Release, "The
Commissioner of Competition decided that the merger, with the undertakings, is more
pro-competitive than a liquidation through bankruptcy proceedings."
The principal undertakings provided by Air Canada include commitments to:
" sell its interest in Canadian's subsidiary Canadian Regional Airlines Limited (CRAL),
at the highest price received during a sixty-day period, provided that price is at or above
the price established by an expert valuator chosen to oversee the sale;
" surrender up to twenty-eight departure/arrival slots during peak hours at Pearson In-
ternational Airport in Toronto, for assignment to other carriers (if CRAL is not sold,
the number of slots to be divested will increase to forty-two);
" refrain from establishing a discount airline service in Eastern Canada until September
30, 2001, in the event that a Canadian discount carrier begins to serve that region of
the country (WestJet currently operates as a discount carrier in Western Canada); and
" surrender key facilities (loading bridges, gates, counters, etc.) at airports across the
country.
In contrast to the above-noted three cases, in May 1999, the Bureau required British
American Tobacco plc (BAT) to agree to a consent order, requiring the sale of all of the
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interest that it proposed to acquire in Rothmans International B.V's Canadian operations,
"to ensure that the sale by BAT would take place within one year from the merger's closing."
Prior to the merger, BAT, through its forty-two percent interest in Imasco, had a significant
indirect interest in Imperial Tobacco. Together, Imperial Tobacco and Rothmans accounted
for approximately eighty-eight percent of manufactured cigarette sales and eighty-one per-
cent of the sales of fine cut or "roll your own" products in Canada.
IV. Developments in Mexico
A. LATEST REPORT FROM THE MEXICAN FEDERAL COMPETITION COMMISSION
In late 1999, the Federal Competition Commission (FCC) issued its "Report on Eco-
nomic Competition," along with its "Gaceta de Competencia Econ6mica" for September-
December 1998. The former contains statements of a general nature and statistics. The
latter partially discloses copies of FCC resolutions upon cases reviewed during 1998.
The following are perhaps the most salient features of the FCC activity:
1. TELMEX is declared to have "substantial market power "The FCC has taken perhaps its
most daring action by issuing a resolution that declares TELMEX as a dominant firm
in the following telecom markets: (a) local basic telephone; (b) access; (c) national long
distance; (d) inter-urban transport; and (e) international long distance. On appeal, the
FCC upheld its ruling, which also recommends that the telecommunications' regu-
lator impose controls to prevent cross subsidies; adjust the interconnection rates with
a factor reflecting productivity increases to bring them to the level of real costs of
providing the service; and require the offering of other services like ports and billing
in a nondiscriminatory basis, among others. TELMEX has contested the ruling before
the judiciary. According to the telecommunications law, the regulator must impose
asymmetric regulations upon firms enjoying market power, in accordance with the
competition statute. The regulator has not done so. In the meantime, the whole in-
dustry is operating in a rather chaotic atmosphere.
2. TELMEX is prevented from buying a cable operator. In a separate case, the FCC also
prevented a TELMEX subsidiary from buying fifty percent of the shares of stock in
another cable operator (TELECABLE) that operates in the State of Mexico (neigh-
boring with the Federal District, where a TELMEX subsidiary operates the largest
CATV network), under the allegation of a potential conversion of the acquired net-
work to telephone service. This ruling begins to conceptually reverse the widely criti-
cized 1995 FCC ruling that cleared the acquisition of forty-nine percent of the shares
of stock of CABLEVISION.
3. ADM and Kyowa Hakko are fined. In the internationally prosecuted lysine case, the
FCC also did its part by imposing fines on the corresponding cartel activity.
4. Nielsen fined. After the corresponding investigation, the FCC found AC Nielsen ille-
gally impeded other firms from access to data from commercial companies. Apart
from fines imposed upon Nielsen and a chain of drugstores, Nielsen was ordered to
include a contractual provision in its agreements, stating that providers of information
were free to disclose such information to Nielsen's competitors.
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5. FCC's basic statistics for 1998.
1997 1998 98/97 (%)
Mergers
Initiated cases and investigations 209 193 -7.7
Notifications 186 182 -2.2
Investigations 22 10 -54.5
Complaints 1 1 0.0
Concluded 218 189 - 13.3
Not objected 207 178 - 14.0
Conditioned 4 4 0.0
Objected 1 1 0.0
Sunset approval 0 1 -
Others 6 5 16.7
In process 24 28 16.7
Privatizations and licenses
Initiated Cases 142 166 16.9
Concluded 175 160 -8.6
Not objected 136 146 7.4
Conditioned 1 8 700.0
Objected 23 0 -100.0
Others 15 6 -60.0
In process 5 8 60
Monopolistic practices and other anti-competitive
restrictions
Initiated cases and investigations 60 62 3.3
Investigations 35 5 -85.7
Complaints 25 57 128.0
Concluded 46 50 8.7
Sanctions or recommendations 9 12 33.3
Negotiated settlements 0 1 -
Against complainant 1 9 800.0
Dismissed 14 11 -21.4
Others 22 17 -22.7
In process 51 63 23.5
Source: Annual Report, 1998, Comisi6n Federal de Competencia, p. 91
B. THE PROPOSED COMPETITION ASPECTS OF THE MEXico-EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
1. Undertaking to apply their corresponding competition laws: While Mexico has already un-
dertaken related obligations under the OECD "Recommendation," as well as through
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Chapter XV of NAFTA, Mexican competition law and policy now obtains full inter-
national dimension in the main trading blocs of the world. Bottom line: Mexico will
have to accelerate implementation of its seven-year-old competition law and policy to
reach the minimum standards of its major league trading partners (the United States,
Canada, and the European Union) since its policy will come under stronger spotlights.
2. Main objectives: (a) to promote cooperation and coordination; (b) to eliminate anti-
competitive activities that impede trade and economic development (note the concern
for domestic issues), as well as to prevent their negative impact on the other party's
interests; and (c) to promote cooperation in "order to clarify any differences in the
application of their respective competition laws." The ambivalent meaning of such a
provision should be noted. On the one hand, it may mean solution of disputable issues
while, on the other, it also may mean possible harmonization since a previous draft
used the language: ".... promote the approximation of the respective legislation in
order to reduce any differences in the application of competition laws."
3. Scope: For the European Union, concerted practices, abuses of dominant positions,
and mergers. For Mexico, absolute (per se) monopolistic practices, relative (rule of
reason) practices and mergers. (The absence of state aid and state monopolies should
be noted. While both were included in an early draft, reflecting the relative asym-
metries between systems, Mexico does not include state aid in its competition state-
ment).
4. Notification: Competition authorities shall give notice of the following enforcement
activities: (a) those relevant to enforcement activities of the other parties; (b) those
that may affect the other party's important interests (note the diplomatic term and its
corresponding obscurity); (c) those that relate to restrictions on competition that may
affect the territory of the other party; and (d) decisions that may be conditioning or
prohibiting action in the territory of the other party.
5. Substance of the notification: Two basic principles are notable: (a) notifications shall
contain sufficient detail as to permit an assessment (description, relevant market, dead-
lines, probable outcome, and measures that may be taken); and (b) notifications shall
be given in a timely manner as to permit the other party to offer an opinion that in
turn may be taken into consideration in the corresponding ruling.
6. Exchange of information: The following information may be exchanged: (a) legal doc-
trine and market studies in the public domain, as well as nonconfidential data or
summaries; (b) "information related to the application of competition legislation pro-
vided that it does not affect the person providing such information, and for the sole
purpose of helping to resolve the procedure" (note the obscurity of the phrase: is its
interagencies' "whisde-blowing" incentives?); and (c) "information concerning any
known anticompetitive activities and any innovations introduced into the respective
legal systems in order to improve the application of their respective competition laws."
The reference to a wide array of activities, as well as the many possible interpretations
of objectives, should be noted.
7. Collection of information: Parties shall help each other in obtaining "other types" of
information in their respective territories. "Other types" is not defined. Can a party
request such assistance in cases not reported through the notification procedure? Or
can the Mexican agency request DGIV to help obtain information in France during
a merger investigation that does not have a Community dimension? On what grounds
could DGIV request information from companies not subject to its jurisdiction?
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8. Coordination of enforcement activities: A party may request (through notification) coor-
dinated enforcement activities with respect to a specific case. Such request may be
denied.
9. Consultations: Parties may request consultations when: (a) a party considers that an
investigation or proceeding conducted by the other party's agency may affect its im-
portant interest, so the consulted agency shall give full and sympathetic consideration
to the views expressed by the requesting party; or (b) a party considers that the interests
of the requesting party are substantially and adversely affected by anticompetitive
practices of whatever origin, so the consulted agency shall give full and sympathetic
consideration to the views and factual materials provided by the requesting agency.
Suggested or requested actions are not binding.
10. Avoidance of conflicts: Parties shall seek a mutually acceptable solution, taking into con-
sideration the impact and benefits, incompatibility of solutions, location of the assets
and importance of penalties to be imposed.
11. Confidentiality: The exchange of information shall be subject to the standards of con-
fidentiality applicable to each party. Confidential information whose dissemination is
expressly prohibited or which, if disseminated, could adversely affect the parties, shall
not be provided without the previous consent of the source of the information. Each
competition authority shall maintain the confidentiality of any information provided
to it in confidence by the other competition authority under this mechanism, and
oppose any application for disclosure of such information by a third party that is not
authorized by the competition authority that supplied the information.
Interestingly, under Mexican law, all documents and information given to the agency are
confidential. Can a foreign agency tip the other party to the confidential information it
received from a company? Can the agency oppose a court order to disclose confidential
information? Is it lawful to indict based upon information not known by the indicted party?
These questions remain unanswered.
12. Concluding items:
(a) The new agreement imposes healthy pressure on Mexican competition enforce-
ment to impose stricter standards;
(b) The new agreement does not include state aid nor state enterprises' disciplines;
and
(c) Provisions on information exchanges are vague; however, there is a clear pro-
vision on confidentiality that guarantees coverage of sensitive data and docu-
ments.
V. Developments in Japan
A number of important developments in the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Act and govern-
ment regulation occurred in 1999. First, a new notification system for Merger & Acquisition
(M&A) transactions was implemented as of January 1, 1999. Later in the year, on July 30,
1999, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) formally announced new Guidelines
for Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements (New Guidelines). Subsequently, on Oc-
tober 7, 1999, the Japan-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement (Cooperation Agreement)
was concluded. The Cooperation Agreement is the first antitrust cooperation agreement
that Japan has entered into with any foreign country and is an important step for further
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cooperation between Japanese and U.S. competition authorities. Finally, the JFTC brought
a few important criminal cases concerning cartel activities.
A. NEW NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR M&A
Effective as of January 1, 1999, the Anti-Monopoly Act was amended to significantly
change the notification system for M&A transactions. These changes include: (i) a reduction
in the applicable scope of notification requirements for stockholding, mergers and acqui-
sitions of businesses, etc., and (ii) new notification requirements by foreign companies in-
volving mergers outside of Japan.
As a result of this latter change, the Anti-Monopoly Act now requires that prior notifi-
cation of the plan of proposed merger between foreign companies be filed with the JFTC
when (i) one of the merger parties has combined sales of its direct subsidiaries and business
offices in Japan of more than ten billion yen and (ii) any other merger party has combined
sales of its direct subsidiaries and business offices in Japan of more than one billion yen.
Mergers between a parent and its subsidiaries or between sister companies having a common
parent, however, are exempt from this notification requirement. Finally, the proposed
merger may not be consummated within thirty days of the JFTC's acceptance of the no-
tification, but the thirty-day period can be shortened when the JFTC considers it necessary
or reasonable to do so.
B. NEW GUIDELINES FOR PATENT AND Krow-How LICENSING
While the JFTC's prior guidelines addressed unfair trade practices involved in patent
and know-how license agreements, the New Guidelines additionally address for the first
time the JFTC's positions on private monopolization and unreasonable restraint of trade
involved in such license agreements.
The New Guidelines stipulate that even if certain acts may be considered "the exercise
of rights under the Copyright Law, the Patent Law, the Utility Model Law, the Design
Law, or the Trademark Act" (and thus generally would be exempt from the application of
the Anti-Monoply Act), if such acts also are considered to deviate from, or run counter to,
the purposes of the intellectual property rights system to, among other things, encourage
innovation, then such acts are no longer deemed "acts recognizable as the exercise of rights,"
and thus no longer exempt from the application of the Anti-Monopoly Act. Accordingly,
if these acts serve to exclude or control business activities of other firms, or to substantially
restrict market competition for particular products or technologies, then such acts will be
illegal as private monopolization under the Anti-Monopoly Act.
In addition, the New Guidelines provide that when a determination regarding the ex-
ercise of rights under the Patent Law, etc. is to be made, the issue of whether the rights
have been exhausted must be taken into account. Thus, restrictions on the sale of patented
products that were once lawfully distributed according to the wishes of the patent rights
holder are handled in the same manner as restrictions on the sale of products in general
under the Anti-Monopoly Act.
The New Guidelines also discuss the JFTC's views on patent and know-how licensing
agreements from the perspective of unreasonable restraint of trade. A patent licensing
agreement can give rise to an unreasonable restraint of trade if it is employed to mutually
restrict business activities. For example, if a patent licensing agreement imposes mutual
restrictions on sales price, manufacturing volume, sales volume, sales outlets, and sales
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territories of the patented products and, as a result, substantially restricts competition in a
market for particular products, it will be illegal under the Anti-Monopoly Act as an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade. Thus, care must be given in cross-licensing, multiple licensing,
and patent pool arrangements that tend to run afoul of the Anti-Monopoly Act.
C. THE JAPAN-U.S. ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENT
The new Cooperation Agreement, which is similar to existing U.S. cooperation agree-
ments with the European Union and Canada, includes provisions for (i) notification of
enforcement activities; (ii) enforcement cooperation and coordination; (iii) positive comity;
(iv) conflict avoidance (comity); and (v) use limitation and confidentiality.
The Japanese government may now expect that aggressive U.S. extraterritorial applica-
tion and enforcement of its antitrust laws will be lessened, or at least become subject to
consultation and coordination between the two countries. It is, however, questionable
whether the United States will refrain from, or lessen, vigorous enforcement of U.S. anti-
trust laws against conduct or entities in Japan. From the U.S. perspective, the Department
of Justice may expect to utilize the Cooperation Agreement to obtain evidence from Japan
and/or request that Japan enforce its Anti-Monopoly Act against conduct or entities in
Japan believed to affect important American interests. Because of confidentiality require-
ments under existing Japanese law and the limited resources of the JFTC, however, it is
also questionable whether the U.S. government's expectation realistically can be met.
Notably, the Cooperation Agreement incorporates positive comity. If the competition
authority of a party believes that anticompetitive activities carried out in the other country
adversely affect its important interests, such competition authority may request that the
competition authority of the other party initiate appropriate enforcement action. The re-
quest must be as specific as possible about the nature of the anticompetitive activities and
their effect on the requesting party's important interests and also must include an offer of
such further information and other cooperation as the requesting competition authority
can provide. The requested competition authority is to carefully consider whether to initiate
or expand ongoing enforcement action concerning the identified anticompetitive activities,
and such authority is to inform the requesting authority of its decision as soon as practically
possible. If enforcement action is initiated, the requesting authority is to be informed of
the outcome and, to the extent possible, of significant interim developments.
The Cooperation Agreement will be implemented only in accordance with each country's
existing laws. It does not change the existing laws of either country, nor is it a comprehensive
antitrust mutual legal assistance agreement of the type authorized by the U.S. International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994.
D. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR CARTEL ACTIVITIES
The JFTC continued its active policy to make criminal accusations (Kokuhatsu) and apply
criminal penalties to serious violations of the Anti-Monopoly Act such as price cartels,
supply restraint cartels, market allocation agreements, bid-rigging, and boycotts.
For example, on February 4, 1999, the JFTC filed a criminal accusation with the Public
Prosecutor General against three manufacturers of ductile iron pipes, i.e., Kubota Corp.,
Kurimoto, Ltd., and Nippon Chutetsukan K.K., accusing them of forming a cartel to al-
locate and maintain market share in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. Four days later, ten officers
of the three manufacturers were arrested, the first time that individuals have been arrested
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for alleged violations of the Anti-Monopoly Act. The three manufacturers also were levied
surcharges in the amount of 11,060 million yen (approximately $100 million at the exchange
rate of $1 being 110 yen), the second largest surcharge for one case. In the above case, the
amount of the surcharges to Kubota Corp. is about 7,072 million yen (approximately $64
million at the above exchange rate), by far the largest single surcharge amount ever imposed.
On October 13, 1999, the JFTC filed a criminal accusation with the Public Prosecutor
General against eleven petroleum companies for bid-rigging for petroleum products pro-
cured by the Central Procurement Office of Japan Defense Agency. On October 19, nine
employees of the seven petroleum companies were arrested, the second time that individuals
have been arrested for criminal violations of the Anti-Monopoly Act.
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